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NO. 3 JANUARY 2021 Introduction 
RCEP-Countries Create Asia-Pacific 
Free Trade Zone 
Trade Facilitation but No Integrated Bloc 
Heribert Dieter 
The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on 15 Novem-
ber 2020 establishes the world’s largest free trade area. The agreement was hailed 
as an important step forward for the international trade system: protectionism is no 
longer the only visible option for the third decade of the twenty-first century. But 
RCEP is a relatively weak instrument. It consolidates existing trade agreements in the 
region, but does not represent a breakthrough to a liberal economic space. It lacks 
the potential to make the Asia-Pacific region into a monolithic trading bloc, nor does 
it contribute to overcoming growing political tensions in the Indo-Pacific. 
 
The process that led to RCEP began in 2012, 
and was initiated by the ASEAN states. The 
agreement includes that organisation’s 
ten members (Brunei, Indonesia, Cambodia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus 
China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and 
New Zealand. One of the original motives 
for the ASEAN states was to create a counter-
weight to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 
After US President Donald Trump withdrew 
from TPP in 2017, the smaller and rather 
less ambitious Comprehensive and Progre-
ssive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (CPTPP) was realised in its place. This 
did not represent a full substitute for RCEP 
because important ASEAN members re-
mained outside, in particular Indonesia 
and Thailand. 
RCEP does not in fact involve great change 
in trade relations between ASEAN and China, 
which have been governed by a free trade 
agreement since 2010. That agreement was 
an initiative of then Chinese Prime Minister 
Zhu Rongji rather than ASEAN. 
Japan, China, South Korea 
So an agreement involving ASEAN and 
China is nothing remarkable. The problem 
was bringing together Asia’s two real eco-
nomic and political heavyweights, China 
and Japan. Concluding RCEP despite politi-
cal tensions in the region represents a 
notable success. 
Tokyo’s relations with Beijing are fraught. 
Alongside the United States, Australia and 
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India, Japan is a member of the Quadri-
lateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a loose 
military alliance in the Indo-Pacific region. 
Although it has been a very weak formation 
to date, the Quad’s principal objective is 
clear: to form a military counterweight to 
China. 
While firmly in the camp taking a criti-
cal view of China’s increasingly assertive 
foreign policy, Japan is also interested in 
expanding trade. In fact the rivalry between 
Tokyo and Beijing explains Japan’s partici-
pation in RCEP: abandoning the agreement 
would have allowed China to further ex-
pand its influence on the rising Asian econo-
mies. 
While Sino-Japanese rivalry has been 
simmering for decades – and occasionally 
coming to the boil – China’s relationship 
with South Korea seldom makes waves. 
One exception was a conflict in 2017, when 
Chinese state media called for a boycott of 
South Korean consumer goods and movies 
after Seoul deployed a US missile defence 
system. The South Korean–owned Lotte 
supermarket chain was specifically targeted 
after providing land for the missile system, 
and responded by announcing it would 
withdraw from China. 
The biggest benefit of RCEP is that it 
eases the application of existing trade 
agreements in the Asia-Pacific region. For 
years economists have been complaining 
that the region’s multifarious trade agree-
ments increase rather than reduce regu-
latory obstacles, limiting their economic 
benefits. Reducing tariffs in bilateral trade 
in fact increased the administrative costs 
for businesses, which had to deal with 
documenting origin. To be traded tariff-free 
under a free trade agreement, goods require 
valid certification of origin. In many cases 
the costs involved have neutralised the 
savings attributable to abolition of tariffs. 
Simplifying Complex Rules 
The economic effects of trade policy have 
to date been disappointing. According to a 
study for the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council in 2015, most businesses were 
not exploiting the opportunities offered by 
existing free trade agreements. Just 22 per-
cent of Asia-Pacific trade (between countries 
with free trade agreements) made use of the 
agreed preferences. The other 78 percent 
was conducted under standard WTO rules 
and tariffs. In other words, the existing free 
trade agreements did not contribute a great 
deal to trade liberalisation in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
RCEP, on the other hand, will reduce ad-
ministrative costs for importers and export-
ers. As soon as it comes into force uniform 
rules of origin will apply across all partici-
pating economies, although businesses will 
still have to compare the cost of certifica-
tion of origin with the tariff they would 
otherwise have to pay. It would certainly 
appear plausible to expect the share of 
trade conducted under RCEP terms to be 
significantly higher than under many of 
the existing trade agreements. 
Violation of Article 24 
RCEP contributes to liberalising trade be-
tween the participating nations by reducing 
the costs of importing and exporting goods 
and services within the free trade zone. But 
it also contributes to the ongoing erosion 
of the multilateral trade system. Every free 
trade agreement represents an exception 
to Article 1 of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the fundamental 
“most-favoured-nation clause” under which 
all trade liberalisations must be granted to 
all WTO members. This is permitted under 
GATT Article 24, which stipulates that 
exempted free trade agreements must cover 
“substantially all the trade”. RCEP does not 
satisfy that condition. Agriculture is largely 
excluded, as is fishing; the arrangements 
for trade in services are weak. But these 
deficits apply to almost all free trade agree-
ments. The reason this state of affairs is 
tolerated is simple: a WTO member would 
have to lodge a complaint, and because they 
all violate Article 24 none of them have 
any interest in so doing. 
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So RCEP does not represent a return to 
the trade-liberalising spirit of the 1980s and 
1990s. It tends to further weaken the multi-
lateral trade system rather than strengthen-
ing it. It is advantageous for the partici-
pating nations, but not for the global econo-
my. Even for its members the effects are 
marginal. A study by the Peterson Institute 
for International Economics (PIIE) suggests 
that the increase in aggregate annual GDP 
of member economies in 2030 will be just 
US$174 billion. Distributed among a popu-
lation that already comprises 2.5 billion 
people the economic benefit at the indi-
vidual level will be almost unmeasurable: 
annual per capita economic output will 
increase by about US$70. Nobody will be 
able to call that a significant gain. 
Shallow Rules without 
Shared Standards 
Despite fears in certain quarters, RCEP will 
not create a new Chinese-led economic 
bloc. Its regulatory ambition is explicitly 
modest: It contains no environmental rules 
at all and refrains from imposing uniform 
labour standards. Even more importantly, 
the agreement does not constrain the future 
trade policy of its signatories. In contrast to 
the European Union, whose customs union 
involves a common trade policy for all its 
members, RCEP permits its participants to 
continue to pursue their own trade policies. 
For example Australia can conclude a free 
trade agreement with the EU as and when it 
chooses. That would change if RCEP became 
a customs union. But in the current politi-
cal climate it is almost inconceivable that 
countries like Australia or Japan would sign 
up for a customs union with China. In that 
sense RCEP creates very close ties to China 
but only in very limited dimensions. The 
agreement is not the beginning of an Asia-
Pacific integration process. In fact, just two 
weeks after its signing the political tensions 
blocking broader integration in the Indo-
Pacific region became very visible. The most 
prominent case is Australia, which has very 
close commercial ties to the People’s Repub-
lic. In November 2020, Beijing’s embassy 
in Canberra provided the Australian media 
with a short document detailing fourteen 
reasons for the rapid deterioration in rela-
tions, including criticism of statements by 
Australian politicians on Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, the South China Sea and Xinjiang. 
Australia: Canary in the Coalmine 
Australia is where the region’s foreign policy 
tensions and contradictions are most ap-
parent. It juggles close security ties with the 
United States with expanding economic co-
operation with China. Canberra has become 
accustomed to fierce criticism from Beijing, 
for example over condemnation of human 
rights violations against the Uighurs in Xin-
jiang and the suppression of the protests in 
Hong Kong, or the exclusion of the Chinese 
technology firm Huawei from contracts 
for Australia’s 5-G network. Now Beijing is 
testing how far it can go. In that sense, 
Australia is the canary in the Asia-Pacific 
coalmine. 
The Australian situation is especially 
complex. The history goes back a long way, 
with Chinese immigrants contributing to 
Australia’s development since the gold rush 
of the 1850s. Until the pandemic there were 
about 180,000 Chinese students in Australia, 
and 1.2 million annual visitors. Australia 
also has roughly that number of residents 
with Chinese roots. 
No other country has profited so strongly 
from China’s economic growth. China has 
been Australia’s largest trade partner since 
2007. In 2018/19 it was by far the biggest 
destination for Australian exports of goods, 
worth about 135 billion Australian dollars 
(AUD) – plus AUD 18 billion in service 
exports. Japan followed with AUD 59 bil-
lion. The sum of Australia’s exports of 
goods and services to China is greater than 
its exports of goods and services to Japan, 
the United States, India and South Korea 
combined. At first glance Australia would 
appear susceptible to arm-twisting. 
In fact Australian society is increasingly 
sceptical towards China. In 2019 half of 
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Australians held a positive opinion of the 
United States, despite all the difficulties 
with the US government and President 
Trump. But only about one-third thought 
positively of China even though Australia’s 
prosperity depends heavily on resource 
exports to China and Chinese demand for 
educational and tourism services. The nega-
tive stance of many Australians has hard-
ened further in 2020, with a full 94 percent 
now supporting their government’s policy 
of reducing dependency on China. 
In Australia we see how thin the sheen 
of modernity can be. Journalist Richard 
McGregor called it “a modern multicultural 
country with deep xenophobic roots”. Aus-
tralia’s massive European immigration pro-
grammes after the Second World War were 
accompanied by a “yellow peril” scare. In 
the 1950s Australians feared Japan, today 
it is China. 
Like the public, the government also 
struggles with ambivalent perceptions of 
China. When German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel visited Australia in 2014 she asked 
then Prime Minister Tony Abbott what fac-
tors influenced Australia’s policy towards 
China. Abbott responded: “fear and greed”. 
All that has changed since then is that the 
sense of threat has grown. 
Today Beijing expects Australia to avoid 
any criticism of its internal affairs: the clas-
sical kowtow. RCEP will contribute absolute-
ly nothing to lessening tensions. Australia 
has lodged complaints against Beijing’s 
arbitrary punitive tariffs – not through the 
dispute settlement process in its existing 
bilateral free trade agreement with China, 
but through the WTO. The advantages of 
multilateral dispute mechanisms become 
especially clear when the going gets rough. 
Japan 
A free trade agreement is useful for China’s 
eternal rival. Tokyo was able to join RCEP 
because the agreement serves its interests 
without incurring significant political costs. 
RCEP permits Japanese businesses to fur-
ther expand their regional manufacturing 
networks. Japanese firms were already very 
active in the ASEAN countries, playing a 
major role in turning Thailand into a sig-
nificant manufacturing location for exam-
ple. Euphoric observers were already calling 
Thailand “the Detroit of Asia”. Simplifying 
the rules of origin will now allow Japanese 
carmakers to source more components 
from across the entire region. 
The exclusion of agriculture is enor-
mously politically helpful for Tokyo. Japan 
has always resisted liberalising agricultural 
trade, whether in the WTO or in bilateral 
and minilateral free trade agreements. Japa-
nese agricultural products are expensive and 
cannot compete on price. Opening the Japa-
nese rice market to imports from the region, 
for example, would have a high political 
price. Combining potentially considerable 
benefits for Japan’s still very competitive 
manufacturing industries with ongoing pro-
tection for Japanese farmers, RCEP appears 
absolutely made-to-measure for Tokyo. 
China 
China stands to profit from the free trade 
zone in similar ways to Japan. Chinese 
enterprises will benefit from reduced trade 
bureaucracy and the possibility to regional-
ise their production networks. But the ques-
tion is whether China is actually seeking 
such internationalisation. In November 
2020 Communist Party General Secretary 
Xi Jinping presented his new economic 
strategy, which forms the backbone of the 
five-year plan for 2021 to 2025. Its essence 
is the idea of “dual circulation”. 
This involves partially decoupling China 
from the global economy. The share of 
exports in China’s GDP has already fallen 
from 36 percent in 2006 to 18 percent in 
2019, while the trade war with the United 
States reminded Beijing how dependent 
parts of its domestic economy are on im-
ports. Almost two-thirds of all semiconduc-
tors used in China in 2019 were produced 
abroad (down from 80 percent in 2015). 
16.6 percent of Chinese imports in 2019 
were semiconductors and other electronic 
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components, with a value of US$350 bil-
lion. 
The list of the ten biggest semiconductor 
manufacturers in 2020 includes six from the 
United States, two from South Korea and 
one each from Taiwan and Japan, but none 
from China. Beijing aims to be 70 percent 
self-sufficient in semiconductors by 2025, 
but analysts regard that as overambitious. 
It is too early to predict the consequences 
of the new policy of dual circulation. Xi has 
described the establishment of “fully domes-
tic supply chains” as a matter of national 
security. Essentially, this represents a re-
tread of the autarchy model of the 1930s. 
If China was serious about pursuing a new 
version of autocentric development, RCEP 
would be superfluous. 
In fact the current leadership envisages 
China continuing to participate fully in 
international circulation. The goals of the 
new strategy include preserving the impor-
tance of the Chinese market for foreign 
companies. Continuing to import foreign-
made goods such as luxury cars for exam-
ple, could help deter foreign governments 
from criticising the Communist Party’s 
new trade strategy too vigorously. As such, 
Beijing would be deliberately exploiting 
the motive of greed cited by Tony Abbott to 
preserve dependencies. German businesses, 
first and foremost the car industry, offer 
prime examples of such dependencies. 
South Korea 
South Korea’s situation is similar to Japan’s. 
South Korea has grown affluent without a 
free trade agreement with China. And like 
Japan, South Korea also shares a profound 
interest in protecting its agricultural sector. 
But both nations learned hard lessons 
in the course of 2020, most prominently 
through production losses in their car in-
dustries early in the year when components 
failed to arrive from China. Hyundai and 
Kia had to suspend manufacturing alto-
gether, while Honda and Nissan in Japan 
were forced to reduce production. In 2019 
31.1 percent of car parts imported to South 
Korea came from China; for Japan the figure 
was 36.9 percent. 
Many corporate leaders in South Korea 
and Japan experienced a painful realisation 
that sourcing components from China de-
mands unfailing logistics. When the Covid 
crisis disrupted supply chains, entire pro-
duction lines ground to a halt; cheap com-
ponents suddenly cost businesses dearly. 
This experience will dampen the interest of 
East Asian manufacturers in sourcing more 
components from China and other South 
East Asian countries after RCEP comes into 
effect. 
India Stands Aside 
RCEP would have been a more significant 
development if India had joined. But the 
country has been wavering for years over 
its role in the global economy. On the one 
hand, Indian companies are very active 
abroad, in manufacturing as well as ser-
vices. Significant parts of the British car 
industry today belong to the Indian Tata 
Group, for example (Jaguar, Land Rover). 
On the other hand Indian governments 
have consistently worked to slow and block 
the development of new rules for interna-
tional trade. Before the beginning of the 
WTO Doha Round in 2001, New Delhi threw 
its weight behind the concerns of the devel-
oping countries and emerging economies. 
The sometimes exaggerated demands of 
this group contributed significantly to the 
failure of the Doha Round. Expectations 
that the election of Narendra Modi in 2014 
would usher in a government with the 
courage to significantly liberalise India’s 
trade policy have proved unfounded. India 
is entrenched in a position of scepticism to-
wards globalisation and is focussing – like 
China in its new five-year plan – above all 
on domestic economic development. 
India is a special case in the contempo-
rary international trade system, having no 
free trade agreement with any of the major 
economic spaces (East Asia, Europe, North 
America). For a long time Prime Minister 
Modi created the impression that he was 
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determined to turn India into a modern 
and internationally competitive economy. 
He often criticised the protectionism of US 
President Trump, and was celebrated at the 
2018 Davos World Economic Forum for his 
appeal to accept globalisation and strength-
en international institutions like the WTO. 
Even then observers were warning about 
the gap between the Indian government’s 
words and deeds. Essentially Modi has 
always pursued a protectionist line. India 
ranked 120th in the Heritage Foundation’s 
2020 Index of Economic Freedom, well 
behind ASEAN members Malaysia (24th), 
Thailand (43rd) and Indonesia (54th). 
India’s relative economic dynamism in 
the early years of Modi’s government and 
his pro-globalisation rhetoric sustained 
an impression that India would join RCEP. 
Participating would have allowed India to 
liberalise its trade relations with dynamic 
economies, simplify trade bureaucracy and 
probably receive a great economic boost. 
An Indian economic opening should not 
be expected in the foreseeable future, for 
two reasons. Firstly, tensions between India 
and China worsened considerably in 2020, 
culminating in a military confrontation in 
the Himalayas. In response New Delhi has 
recalibrated its foreign policy and is today 
more willing to join the United States, Japan, 
Australia and other democratic states in chal-
lenging China. It is currently inconceivable 
that India would join a free trade agree-
ment in which China was also involved. 
The second reason is the renaissance of 
an economic policy that concentrates on 
the internal market and seeks to limit im-
ports. “Atmanirbhar Bharat” seeks a high 
degree of economic autarchy. Today New 
Delhi is pursuing the strategy that John 
Maynard Keynes propagated in 1933 as 
“national self-sufficiency”. At the end of 
November 2020, immediately after the sign-
ing of the RCEP agreement, Indian Foreign 
Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar railed 
against globalisation, asserting that India’s 
industry had been seriously harmed by ear-
lier liberalisation measures. 
The Modi government thus cannot be 
expected to abandon its course and revert 
to a policy of economic opening. This trade 
policy reversal is especially unexpected 
because the Indian public has always re-
sponded very positively to the effects of 
globalisation. 
Strong Support for Globalisation 
It is conspicuous that RCEP encounters little 
or no political resistance in the participating 
nations. The main reason for the acquies-
cence of their civil societies is that RCEP 
involves a group of countries that one could 
call the “winners of globalisation”. Support 
for trade liberalisation and a far-reaching 
international division of labour remains 
strong in the Asia-Pacific region. While the 
original proponents of globalisation, prin-
cipally the majority of OECD countries, have 
become weary and mistrustful, many Asian 
nations articulate a remarkably clear desire 
for greater opening and connectivity. In 
surveys the populations of Vietnam and the 
Philippines consistently exhibit the greatest 
support for globalisation. People in most 
RCEP countries regard more international 
trade as an opportunity rather than a threat. 
The consequences of globalisation are 
seen a great deal more critically in many 
OECD states today. The loss of employment 
through relocation of production to coun-
tries with lower wages and weaker environ-
mental standards outweighs the consumer 
benefits of cheaper imported products. The 
widely heard assertion that the EU and the 
United States should be taking action to 
liberalise their own trade policies is there-
fore a misplaced and unpolitical demand. 
Donald Trump won the election in 2016 by 
emphasising the negative effects of globali-
sation for American workers. Support for 
trade protectionism has probably increased 
since then. President Biden did not win the 
2020 election by promising free trade, which 
lacks popularity both within the Democratic 
Party and among the broader electorate. 
Europe, on the other hand, often regards 
itself as the trailblazer of free trade. In fact 
of course the EU is just as protectionist as 
the United States, placing strict constraints 
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on agricultural trade, as well as certain 
other sectors such as the car industry. When 
the Covid crisis is over, the EU will probably 
further tighten its trade policy, for example 
by introducing tariffs to promote low-car-
bon production processes. For developing 
countries and emerging economies such 
climate tariffs can rapidly become barriers, 
for example if emissions associated with 
transport are factored in. Cut flowers from 
African countries could then disappear 
from European shops. That kind of protec-
tionism enjoys broad public support in 
Europe. But from the perspective of poorer 
countries climate-driven trade restrictions 
represent more a threat than a promise. 
RCEP is a positive development, with a 
large group of nations continuing to sup-
port trade liberalisation. But it will not 
significantly alter the future of internation-
al trade. What it will do is provide the sim-
plification of trade bureaucracy that busi-
nesses in the Asia-Pacific region urgently 
need, and facilitate trade in goods and ser-
vices in the region. It will not, however, do 
anything to resolve the political conflicts 
that hinder or prevent broader economic 
and political integration in the Asia-Pacific 
region: Beijing’s contested territorial claims 
in the South China Sea, its increasingly 
aggressive foreign policy and the still un-
resolved relationship between state-sub-
sidised Chinese enterprises and trade part-
ners subject to free-market processes. 
At the same time it is conspicuous that 
the two most populous states in the Indo-
Pacific region are turning away from the 
open trade paradigm. This will probably 
lead to a slowing of economic growth in 
both countries, and especially in India 
delay recovery from the consequences of 
the pandemic. 
RCEP will likely mark the high-water 
mark of integration in the Asia-Pacific 
region, rather than the starting shot for re-
gional economic and political union. 
Prof. Dr. Heribert Dieter is Senior Associate in the Global Issues Research Division at SWP and 
Associate Professor at the University of Potsdam. 
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